James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 1

2019-2020

MOVE:
Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing
Charles Abraham

James Madison University

Follow this and other works at: http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/jmurj
Recommended Chicago Notes and Bibliography Citation
Abraham, Charles. “MOVE: Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing.” James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal
7, no. 1 (2020): 27-36. http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/jmurj/vol7/iss1/3.
This full issue is brought to you for free and open access by JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

2019-2020 / Volume 7

MOVE:
Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing

Charles Abraham
“Philadelphia Free the MOVE 9 Forum” by Joe Piette is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

On May 13, 1985, the city of Philadelphia erupted into flames. Under the orders of Mayor Wilson Goode, the
Philadelphia Police Department dropped a bomb onto the row house containing MOVE, a cult-like organization,
on Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia. The resulting fire killed eleven people, including five children, and burned
down sixty-one houses. By examining newspaper articles on MOVE, the bombing by the Philadelphia Police, and
the public’s response, this paper investigates how Mayor Goode was able to continue his political career and how
this bombing has faded into obscurity outside of the city. The media’s attitude and reporting on MOVE, the city’s
lack of connection with MOVE’s beliefs, and the efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing
have caused this tragedy to become largely forgotten.
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In a fortified row house in West Philadelphia, a bomb
dropped by Philadelphia Police killed eleven MOVE
members, including five children, and burned down sixtyone her houses after a lengthy standoff between the two
groups. MOVE is a cult-like organization which eschewed
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members
lived communally, ate raw food, left garbage on their yards,
and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents
of Osage Avenue. The MOVE bombing, remembered as
“May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was the first time a
U.S. city bombed itself, and it could have been a pivotal
moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and for
the city of brotherly love. Instead, the bombing has faded
into obscurity, with only minimal consequences for the
city government and for the city. Public antipathy and the
efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing,
revealed and even enabled by media reporting, have caused
this tragedy to become largely forgotten.1

tables, nuts, and eggs; used no medicine or western clothing;
disposed of their garbage in the yard; and used outhouses
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE were
not allowed to attend school and had never eaten cooked
food or watched television. These were the first “pure”
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed
to the corrupting influences of social and political institutions. Members protested outside of zoos and pet stores,
which often led to arrests though the police did not believe
MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2

MOVE: The Organization

The other residents of Powelton Village did not hold a
great opinion of MOVE, which lived communally in three
townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located
near Drexel University and the University of Pennsylvania,
was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven for
political activists. In 1976, neighbors began complaining
about children playing in the yard without diapers and
in unsanitary conditions. The complaints of Powelton
residents’ and MOVE’s campaign against police brutality
caused the Philadelphia Police Department to set up 24hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses, fueling their
belief that they were being targeted by the police. The next
year, MOVE members began to sit out on the porch holding
rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their
neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical
black organization, much like the Black Panthers, because
of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many
people in Philadelphia believed the public display of weapons
to be the start of the organization becoming more militant.3

Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Movement for Life, later shortened to MOVE, in 1972 in West
Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE
was primarily a black organization, although white people
could join as well. As an anti-establishment and anti-technology group, its members ate a diet of only raw fruits, vege1 For further reading on cults in America, see Willa Appel, Cults in America:
Programmed for Paradise (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), which
discusses the phenomenon of cults and how one is indoctrinated or breaks out of
a cult. For further reading on African Americans in mid-20th century America see
Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics and Prosperity: Black Americans and White
Institutions, 1940-1975 (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or Annette Gordon-Reed, ed.,
Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), which discuss how African Americans were treated by the police and
in the court as well as other white-dominated institutions during this period. For
more on MOVE, see J.M. Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts:
MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanism,” The Black Scholar 32, no.1 (Spring
2002): 11-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41068961, which argues MOVE was a
radical and religious group that exemplified revolutionary black humanist thinking.
For more on the effect of the media on the perception of MOVE, see Kimberly
Sanders and Judson Jeffries, “Framing MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murder
of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” Journal of African
American Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2013): 566-586, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12111-013-9252-7, which discusses how press coverage led to antipathy towards
the MOVE organization. For more on the MOVE bombing and its aftermath, see
Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus
MOVE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hizkias Assefa, Extremist
Groups and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia (New York:
Praeger, 1988); Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE—This is America!” Sage Journals
28, no. 4 (April 1987): 5-28, https://doi.org/10.1177/030639688702800402;
Georgia A. Persons, “The Philadelphia MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models
of Mayoral Leadership,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (December 1987): 249-260, https://doi.
org/10.2307/274482; or John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987), which
all discuss the bombing and how it affected Philadelphia and the city government.
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on MOVE and the bombing from 19851987. Temple University Library Special Collections houses the records of the
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission regarding the MOVE bombing and
its antecedents.

28

J MUR J

James Madison Undergraduate
Research Journal

The MOVE bombing,
remembered as “May 13, 1985“
in West Philadelphia,
was the first time a U.S. city
bombed itself.

Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as
neighbors in Powelton continued complaining about
MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance
began to infuriate the organization. Between 1977 and
1978, MOVE placed bomb-timing devices, though no
explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in
2 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 27-29; Sanders and Jeffries,
“Framing MOVE,” 568; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,”
13; Jack N. Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility:
Lessons of the MOVE Disaster,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no.
1 (Winter 1991): 2-3, https://doi.org/10.2307/3325510; Assefa, Extremist Groups,
14-15.
3 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 3-4; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21.
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London.4 These devices were left with threatening letters
stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia
stopped its harassment. The organization had begun a feud
with then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had previously served as
Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and run for mayor on
a law-and-order campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton
Village came to a head in 1978 after an agreement between
the organization and the city made on May 5 disintegrated.
The city and MOVE had agreed that the city would end
the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would
relocate to a residence outside the city. MOVE saw the city
as the center of the societal corruption they sought to end
and stayed past the 90-day limit. While several organizations
active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE
or supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay
in the neighborhood, MOVE and the police engaged in a
protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman,
Officer James Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE
members to jail for the officer’s death.5

The policy of non-confrontation
and avoidance proved
ineffective, and in 1984 the
Philadelphia Police began to
plan a course of action against
MOVE.
After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took
up residence in a row house on Osage Avenue in Cobbs
Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, the organization and the
residents of Osage Avenue coexisted peacefully. In time,
however, tensions began to as lifestyle differences emerged
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE removed the
flea collars off of their neighbors’ pets, collected and fed wild
animals, built pigeon coops, and left their refuse outside
in their yard. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents
was that the MOVE children appeared to be malnourished
and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The
neighbors were told Wilson Goode would help them after
he had become mayor, but in late 1983 after the mayoral
election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to
harass their neighbors.6
4 While MOVE left these letters and devices across the nation and internationally, they were still only an organization local to Philadelphia and were not
expanding nationally.
5 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 30-32; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 16; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 20-37. Nine members of MOVE were
convicted in the shooting of Officer James Ramp during the 1978 shootout
with the police and were sentenced with thirty to one hundred years in prison.
Thesemembers are known collectively as “The MOVE 9.”
6 Assefa, Extremist Groups, 102-108; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles” 5.

MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release
the jailed MOVE 9 members, and they knew if they
began to harass residents of Osage Avenue—a middleclass neighborhood and the bedrock of Goode’s political
support—the city would have to pay attention to them.
Despite MOVE holding the block hostage, Goode used
apolicy of “appeasement, non-confrontation and avoidance,”
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible.7 City
Operating Departments—Health, Water, Human Services,
Streets, and Licences and Inspections—were barred by city
policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the MOVE
row house. City officials believed that once MOVE members
realized the city was ignoring them, they would either change
their belligerent behavior or leave the city. The policy of
non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in
1984 the Philadelphia Police began to plan a course of action
against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.8

May 13, 1985
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action
against MOVE in the spring of 1985. He wanted to explore
the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and
obtaining a court order to hold the children. MOVE began
fortifying their row house in earnest in the fall of 1984 and
the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad
ties, logs, and steel plates on the top of their house; they
used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985,
they announced with bullhorns their intentions to kill the
mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified
house. Neighbors threatened to take matters into their own
hands after claiming to have seen men with rifles on the
roof and in the bunker of the house. On the morning of
May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for
the arrests of four MOVE members. These warrants were for
misdemeanor charges and primarily intended to get them
out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode required that any
officers involved in the 1978 shooting not be involved in
the operation on Osage Avenue, but several of those officers
were present in the assault force. At 5:30 a.m. outside the
MOVE row house, police used a bullhorn to announce the
names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession
of explosives and terroristic threats and gave the members
fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police insertion
teams then entered the houses on either side. In response,
MOVE shot at the police force from inside. Over the next
hour and a half, the Philadelphia police fired over 10,000
7 “Excerpts from Commission’s Report on Bombing,” New York Times, March
7, 1986.
8 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 7; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia
MOVE Incident,” 255.
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rounds of ammunition on the row house and used explosives
to blow holes in the walls. By 10:40 a.m., the front of the
house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE installed
in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the
house. When it became clear their tactics had failed, Mayor
Goode announced during a televised press conference he
would take the house by any means necessary.9
After the press conference, the police sought another way
to force the eleven people out of the house that included
the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive
entry device around 4:30 p.m., and around thirty minutes
later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the entry device. At
5:27 p.m., the police dropped an explosive package from a
helicopter onto the bunker of the house. When the bomb
exploded, it did not remove the bunker; rather, it ignited
a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting
blaze, the police and fire commissioners let the bunker burn.
It was not until 6:32 p.m. that the fire department turned
on its hoses, and it was not until 9:30 p.m. that they took
more active steps to contain the fire. The fire raged on until
11:41 p.m., engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 additional
houses, killing John Africa and the ten other occupants of
the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250
men, women, and children homeless.10

Response to the MOVE Bombing
The bombing of the MOVE row house should have been
a pivotal event in the history of Philadelphia, showing the
incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after
the bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police
Department received support from around the country. The
Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended
the use of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic.”
Gates also stated that Mayor Goode had “provided some of
the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician”
and that he hoped Mayor Goode “ran for national office.”
Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman,
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is
based on conflict and confrontation.” Roy Innis, who was
the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
called Mayor Goode’s handling of the crisis “heroic.” Tom
Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc.,
which sells munitions to police departments, said “the police
exercised remarkable restraint in not using the device earlier.”
However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to
9 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 87-94; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 111-113;
Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 6-8.
10 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 95-96; Assefa, Extremist Groups,
113; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 9.
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comment on the incident, not wishing to criticize their
fellow officers.11
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the
Philadelphia Police Department, not all law enforcement
officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of
the MOVE crisis. The director of the American Federation
of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every rule
in the book” when it came to their handling of the incident.
James Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it
by saying, “They burned down the village to save the village”
before adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia
Police Department were “really unheard of.” Arenberg stated
the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment
available to any modern police department.” The MOVE
bombing captured the attention of the world, and as many
law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the
Philadelphia police, so too did the media, both national and
international.12

Front pages of many
newspapers showed pictures of
smoldering row houses in West
Philadelphia.
The media took a largely critical view of the incident and
Mayor Goode. Many newspapers around the world were
unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE house and called
Philadelphia a “war zone.” Front pages of many newspapers
showed pictures of smoldering row houses in West
Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures
as resembling “war-torn Beirut” and the New York Daily
News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly
blunder.” The bombing attracted international attention
with newspapers in France paying considerable attention
to the incident. The France-Soir had an aerial photo of the
devastation, and Liberation, a French tabloid, called it “one
of the most unbelievable urban guerrilla operations that
America has ever known.” In Moscow, a newscaster reported
“six dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is
the sinister result of a bloody slaughter which was launched
by police.” The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely
11 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez, and John Woestendiek, “How
the Bomb Decision Was Made,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield,
Doreen Carvajal, and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire: Sent Two
Days Prior to Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1985; William K. Stevens,
“Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14,
1985.
12 Tim Weiner, “Experts on Police Procedure Criticize Bombing of House,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1985.
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harsh in its criticism, writing there was “no excuse” for the
bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill.”
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling the
bombing reckless and including comments from people such
as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union, who called the bombing
“totally unjustified,” and New York City mayor Edward
Koch, who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner
so stupid to allow a bomb to be thrown into a house, [he]
would remove him.” The Dallas Morning News focused on
the residents of the 6200 block of Osage Avenue. Kevin
Young called the bombing “unjustifiable” and said Osage
Avenue “is not a battle zone.” Another resident said that he
was “totally disgusted” with the city and how it had handled
the crisis. These harsh comments about the administration
and its actions were widespread after May 13, 1985 but only
for a short period of time. The national news moved on after
a few weeks of reporting on MOVE, and eventually only the
Philadelphia Inquirer was doing any meaningful reporting on
the aftermath of the bombing.13
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more
supportive of Philadelphia and the mayor. The New York
Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more
on the complaints from the neighbors against MOVE, and
framed the incident as a city reacting against behavior that was
well out of the norm for a working-class African American
neighborhood. In the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of
a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said that “all
you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it,
you live with it.” The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about the
group’s strange philosophy and how while it was, in theory,
a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for
the environment,” in practice “its history was replete with
violence, obscenity and filth.” The Chronicle article stated that
former MOVE member Donald Glassey had testified John
Africa “had planned an armed confrontation with police and
had MOVE members make bombs and buy firearms.” The
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as
a radical organization and defined the cause of the siege as
MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order
from police.” The Herald article also discussed neighbors’
complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house.”
The positive media surrounding the administration shielded
it from dealing with the harsh realities of their actions and
13 Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz: West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page
Headlines Around the World,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police
Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics Questioned
– Experts Call Use of Explosives in Siege Situations ‘Reckless,’” Atlanta JournalConstitution, May 15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless by Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted
Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE Incident,” Dallas Morning
News, May 15, 1985.

allowed it a reprieve from the negative media of the bombing.
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis
were highly criticized and opinion was divided among news
sources in the city and around the globe, but it was a much
different story among the Philadelphia public.14

The national news moved on
after a few weeks of reporting
on MOVE.
Many believed they were receiving biased news reports. One
woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor
did a commendable job,” and “[the press was] questioning
the mayor too much.” Tourists visiting Philadelphia in the
aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It
could have happened anywhere.” One resident of Northeast
Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.”
Steward Beatty, also of Northeast Philadelphia, thought the
bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody
can still make decisions instead of doing nothing.” Steve
Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the bombing
was “like Vietnam.” While the media and the police around
the country were divided on the incident, most people in
Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but remained
supportive of the mayor and the city overall.15
The media’s discussion about the incident shifted closer to
the view of the public. While it was a tragedy, most blame
rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the
bombing, MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their
row house and the neighboring house should the police
attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will
everyone in this block go down, the knee joints of America
will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the
letter threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make
an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in [sic] house
down and burn you all up with us.” The city administration
began using the letter to blame MOVE for setting the fire
that burned down sixty-one houses and killed eleven people.
Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his
“personal opinion” that MOVE “started or assisted” the fire,
and was “convinced that MOVE people saturated those roofs
with gasoline.” Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group
14 Eisner, “Media Blitz”; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb”; “MOVE’s Strange
Philosophy of Militancy and Escapism,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985;
“Radical Group Holds Police at Bay,” Lexington Herald-Leader, May 14, 1985.
15 Joyce Gemperlein, “Visitors Say the City’s Image Will Survive,” Philadelphia
Inquirer, May 19, 1985; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb.”
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that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside an urban area.” The
mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant
as evidence that MOVE started the fire but that the letter
“says what it says, in [his] opinion.”16

The city attempted to paint MOVE
as the agressor, framing the
actions they had undertaken as
merely providing law and order.
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the
street, the city began to discuss how the entry device used
was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire.
The explosive used in the bombing was known as Tovex
TR-2, manufactured by the DuPont Company, which
described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on
the market.” Before the decision to use Tovex on the house,
the Philadelphia Police Department secretly tested different
explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not
meant for above-ground buildings but was instead developed
primarily for underground mining. The media began to use
the DuPont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe
explosive to push the idea that the fire was not the fault of the
city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word “bomb” as well,
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry
device, which was to take and somehow remove the bunker
from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the
house.” The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressor,
thereby framing the actions they had undertaken as merely
providing law and order, despite it being clear that the
aggression towards MOVE was excessive.17
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official
investigation into the administration’s actions, Mayor Goode
announced his intentions to create a special commission to
examine the incident. William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s
predecessor, said the MOVE Special Commission “has
serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how
it conducted itself,” and “there are many, many unanswered
questions and in some cases contradictions that cannot and
should not and must not, if faith is to be restored, be swept
under the rug.” The former mayor also said the city should
release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone
in Philadelphia would know what the premise of [the]
decisions were.” Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s
actions, Robert S. Hurst, then-president of Lodge 5 of the
16 Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire.”
17 Wolf, Marimow, Lopez, and Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision Was
Made”; Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened.”
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Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate responsibility of
the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the
members of this terrorist organization known as MOVE,”
and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71
percent of respondents believed the mayor did a good or
excellent job dealing with MOVE.18
The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to
conduct the investigation. James R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s
explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the
bureau two years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in
the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to investigate
the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on
the explosive device indicated the only explosive used was
Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident,
Officer William C. Klein testified he had included a second
explosive, C-4, in the device when he had assembled it. The
commission also hired six other investigators to work under
the lead investigator, Neil P. Shanahan. These investigators
came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, and Maryland,
as well as the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III,
chairman of the commission, said the “search for the
highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and
wide-ranging.” Brown added these investigators brought “the
skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill
its mandate.” The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist
programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the inquiry
continued, it became very critical of how the city managed
the MOVE incident.19
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, the
testimonies began to paint Mayor Goode in an unflattering
light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as
misinformed and misled by his subordinates, claiming he was
as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as
Goode’s managing style as both city manager and mayor was
very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney,
Bernard L. Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had
heard “the mayor [say] to the police commissioner, ‘You are
the professional and you need not keep me advised of all
the details.’” When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was
asked about this statement, he thought it was “somewhat
unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s
“management style has always been to get involved in all
the significant details.” The hearing revealed the mayor’s
18 Larry Eichel and Robin Clark, “MOVE Death Toll Reaches 11; Goode to
Pick Panel for Probe,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985.
19 Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission Hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6
Investigators,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985.
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attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as
it was occurring by purposefully asking to not get all the
details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the
most significant from former mayor William Green, who
said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg”
responsibility: he could not be responsible for the incident
because he had only accepted the recommendations from his
subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission,
criticized Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only
person who had the foggiest notion of what was going to
happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant.”
While these hearings demonstrated there was a major issue
between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block
of Osage Avenue, they also showed there had been poor
communication, inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on
the organization, and incompetent leadership.20

An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly
after the report was released, stated the author “[disagreed]
with those who think Wilson Goode should resign” and
noted Philadelphians should not just judge the mayor on
the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his
entire first term.” Mayor Goode also received support from
his church followers after the report. The Inquirer reported
“more than 250 people […] gathered to pray for Mayor
Goode,” and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the
prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic support
the mayor has in the black community.” Despite the findings
of the MOVE Special Commission, Mayor Goode’s support
in the city stayed strong and grew thanks to these efforts by
local organizations and newspapers. This outcry of support
for the mayor hid the actions he had taken and lessened the
loss of life in the most important event of his career.22

When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision
on the actions of the administration and the police, its
report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed
“reckless disregard for life and property.” The report
stated, “dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was
unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand,”
and “the plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived,
and hastily approved.” Commissioner Gregore Sambor and
Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly
negligent” for not calling off the siege. The report also
called the mayor “grossly negligent” and said he “clearly
risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the
house and this was “unjustified homicide.” The commission
found that the mayor “failed to perform his responsibility
as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in
the preparation, review, and oversight of the plan.” Goode
“abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after midday,
he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [at] great
risk to life and property.” Despite believing MOVE to be
an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report
declared the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the
row house had been “excessive and unreasonable,” and “the
failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop
such an excessive amount of force was unconscionable,”
especially with children inside the building.21

Despite the findings of the MOVE
Special Commission, Mayor
Goode’s support in the city
stayed strong.

Mayor Goode After MOVE
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor
Goode were labeled as devastating by allies of the mayor, but
the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive.
20 Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details; Rendell Testifies on MOVE,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985.
21 Thomas Ferrick Jr., “Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in
Decisions: Children’s ‘Homicide’ Is Alleged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1986.

In the years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s
reputation began to recover. Over a year after the MOVE
incident, Goode said that “[he] had some difficult days and
difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a
lot of good, constructive things.” John F. White Jr., a city
councilman, said “the administration has demonstrated far
more experience over [the] year.” The incident faded from
public memory, overshadowed by Goode’s more successful
endeavors, such as ending a strike involving 14,000 city
employees, which created more confidence in him and his
administration. When the city experienced a major trash
and sanitation issue, Mayor Goode proposed a trash-tosteam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. When
several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption
charges, Mayor Goode helped restore the department by
implementing a reform package. In the initial aftermath of
the MOVE disaster, it seemed that Goode’s political career
was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly
to repair his image.23

22 Acel Moore, “Bringing on the Problems: Wilson Goode Sometimes Is His
Own Worst Enemy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 20, 1986; Russell Cooke,
“Praying for Goode: The Faithful Rise Up,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 13, 1986.
23 Russell Cooke, “For Goode, A Year of Recovery,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
January 4, 1987; Robin Clark, “Police Reforms Unveiled: Goode Begins Search
for Chief,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1985; Ferrick Jr., “Report on
MOVE.”

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

33

In 1988, Goode ran for reelection against former mayor and
police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested
election, with only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of
652,307 total votes. In Rizzo’s concession, he warned Goode
that he would “have to deliver or [he is] going to be right
on him.” Despite the bad publicity that his actions against
MOVE had brought him, the good publicity he had received
since allowed Goode to rehabilitate his image and beat Rizzo
to become mayor for his second term. Goode’s reelection
shows how successfully MOVE and the MOVE bombing
had been removed from the public eye; even though nothing
truly changed after the bombing, people had moved on.24

Thirty Years Later
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public
Radio looked back at MOVE and learned that many young
Philadelphians never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema
Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only twenty
minutes north of Philadelphia, never learned about MOVE
in class but instead learned about it from her father.
NPR’s Gene Demby, who grew up in South Philadelphia
in the 1980s, also never discussed MOVE in class. Robin
Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at New
York City’s New School, believes that other radical groups
never identified with MOVE’s anti-technology, pro-animal
rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs, leading the group to be
forgotten in discussions of radical groups. Groups similar to
the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and the Weaver family
in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, held overlapping beliefs and would
mention each other in their manifestos, but “none of them
mentioned MOVE.” Unlike the Branch Davidians who
faced off against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were besieged by the
FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE.
This was not a showdown between a fringe radical group and
the federal government, but with the local government. A
lack of connection between the general public and MOVE’s
core beliefs, as well as the city’s general ambivalence toward
the group, caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity.
MOVE generally has only one article written on it each year,
usually on the anniversary of the bombing or about the
MOVE 9, and only receives minor mention in articles about
events the group attends. This relative obscurity compared
to the other extremist groups has caused the fallout of the
bombing to be forgotten.25
24 Christopher Hepp and H. G. Bissinger, “Rizzo Concedes Defeat: Says He’ll Remain
Active in Politics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 24, 1987.
25 Gene Demby, “I’m From Philly. 30 Years Later, I’m Still Trying to Make Sense of
the MOVE Bombing,” National Public Radio, May 13, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-makesense-of-the-move-bombing. Gene Demby, “Why Have So Many People Never Heard o f
the MOVE Bombing?” National Public Radio, May 18, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/18/407665820/why-did-we-forget-the-move-bombing.
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Conclusion

Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was
the first sign that the MOVE incident held minimal lasting
significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second
sign was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about
MOVE; children living in Philadelphia do not learn about
an event where the mayor bombs his own city. The MOVE
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career,
as well as the careers of the others involved in the decisionmaking that led to the siege of the MOVE row house and
subsequent bombing of its bunker. This should have been an
event woven into the very fabric of the city; instead, it was
forgotten—the perpetrators remained in office and repaired
their image, and their victims faded into obscurity. Nothing
significant changed after the MOVE bombing: there were no
major changes to policy or regulations in response to MOVE
or police actions, and for the residents of Osage Avenue all
they received was a city bombing their homes.26

This should have been an event
woven into the very fabric of the
city; instead, it was forgotten.
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the
history of Philadelphia, and yet its occurrence is rarely, if
ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact
in the psyche of Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of
those eleven MOVE members. Despite two grand juries
on the bombing, no one from the city administration ever
faced any consequences resulting from their part in burning
down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five of
them children. The city administration did their best to
rehabilitate their image and move past the bombing without
suffering any consequences, aside from a lawsuit paid to
the surviving MOVE members. Reports of the MOVE
bombing began as highly critical but over time became
supportive, enabling the administration to shift the blame
for the bomb and subsequent fire onto MOVE, eventually
leading to the reelection of Wilson Goode and allowing
the MOVE bombing to become largely forgotten. That the
MOVE bombing left no major lasting effect on the city of
Philadelphia is a disgrace and a disservice to those whose
homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result
of the city’s actions.

26 The homeowners on Osage Avenue had their homes rebuilt, but now most
are abandoned due to shoddy reconstruction.
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Charles Abraham (‘20) graduated with a major in History and minors in Anthropology and Classical Studies.
From Warrington, Pennsylvania, he enjoys being outside, whether that means relaxing, hiking with friends,
or working in the garden.
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